

THE DEFENSE COLOMBIAN SOVEREIGNTY AT THE GUAJIRA PENINSULA,
THROUGH THE INTEGRATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS
OF NATIONAL POWER

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

THE DEFENSE OF COLOMBIAN SOVEREIGNTY AT GUAJIRA PENINSULA,
THROUGH THE INTEGRATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
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ACRONYMS

ALBA	Alianza Bolivariana para Pueblos de Nuestra America (Bolívarian Alliance for our America people.
ANDIARIOS	Asociacion Colombiana de Editores de Diarios y Medios Informativos (Colombian Association of Informative Media and Diaries Editors)
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economical.
EE11	Engesa Enterprise 11 (Model 11 of Engesa, Brazilian Military Enterprise, known as Urutu)
EE9	Engesa Enterprise 9 (Model 9 of Engesa Brazilian Military Enterprise, known as Cascabel)
ELN	Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army)
EPM	Empresas Publicas de Medellin (Medellin Public enterprises)
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Freedom for the Vasque Country in Euskera language)
FARA	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Azul (Blue Revolutionary Armed Forces)
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAEDEN	Instituto de Altos Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (National Defense High Studies Institute)
LAV	Light Armored Vehicle
MPPRE	Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Relaciones Exteriores (International Relationships People Power Ministry)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SICAD	Sistema Complementario de Administracion de Divisas (Money Exchange Complementary System)
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union de Naciones Suramericanas (Southamericans Nations Union)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Due to the current instability in the Venezuelan government, Caracas is searching for an external excuse to increase militant nationalism in its population. The border between Colombia and Venezuela has been place of aggressions against the Colombian population by the Venezuelan government with the intent of eliciting a strong response by the Colombian government. A conflict between the two countries would be a smoke screen to draw the public's attention from the difficult social and economic situation that Venezuela is experiencing nowadays. The Colombian Army does not have a strong capability to respond to a combined arms aggression at the border. Facing aggression from Venezuela, the Colombian government must make an integrated analysis on the threatened territory. The instruments of national power are a good strategic tool for this purpose. It is possible that the international community might intervene in this crisis in order to avoid a military conflict between the two countries. Nonetheless, the Colombian government has to be ready to react in the case that this assumption does not became a fact.

Scope

In order to understand the present crisis, we will examine the geography of Colombia's Guajira Department, review the history of border tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, describe the population that lives in the Guajira Peninsula, compare the military capabilities of both countries, and review the instruments of National Power and compare how Venezuela and Colombia are employing them in the crisis.

The Great Colombia

The Great Colombia was a republic created by Simon Bolívar on February 15, 1819 in the city of Angostura, after the independence from the Spanish kingdom and was ratified by the Cucutá Congress in 1821. This new nation was comprised of Nueva Granada, Venezuela, and Quito, and included the territories of the republics of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama and Surinam in whole or in part. Simon Bolívar named himself as President and, since the beginning, had to deal with the differences between centralists and federalists politicians.¹

Simon Bolívar's objective was the creation of a great country that would be able to resist external threats like Spain. This project was consolidated thanks to Bolívar's continuous victories such as those at Boyacá on August 7, 1819; Carabobo on June 24, 1821; Maracaibo Lake on July 24, 1823; and Ayacucho on December 9, 1824. Its independence was recognized by United States on 1822 and United Kingdom on 1825.²

On January 1830, Bolívar, serving as president of The Great Colombia, convened a constitutional congress called "The Admirable Congress" in Bogotá, the capital city of The Great Colombia. Nevertheless, the redacted constitution was not accepted by Venezuela. Disgruntled Venezuelan delegates then clamored for independence for their province. Seeing his dream fade away, Bolívar renounced the presidency and was

¹ Pericles Perez, *Futuro Incierto de la Gran Colombia* (Bloomington, IN: Palibrio, 2014), Kindle location 1021 of 4166.

² La Historia Con Mapas, "La Gran Colombia," accessed December 9, 2015, <http://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/america/colombia/gran-colombia/>.

replaced by Rafael Urdaneta, who became the last president of The Great Colombia. A disillusioned Bolívar died in Santa Marta on December 17 of the same year.³

Geography of the Guajira Peninsula

To understand the military challenges posed by the current crisis in the Guajira Peninsula, it is necessary to first describe and analyze the geographical conditions in the area. The Guajira Peninsula is part of the territories of Colombia and Venezuela as explained in figure 1. It has an area of 28,848 square kilometers and its geography includes dunes, plains, and mountains. The peninsula divides into three regions from northeast to southwest: High Guajira, Medium Guajira, and Low Guajira.

The High Guajira is located at the peninsula's far north and is half-deserted with scarce vegetation, especially cactus. It is the driest region in Colombia. It has mountains like Macuira, Jarará and La Teta Hills, that have less than 650 meters altitude above sea level. The Medium Guajira is located south of the High Guajira, and is characterized by flat, sandy, and undulating terrain. The Low Guajira is composed of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Oca Hills. It is humid and its fertile soil is suitable for farming because it has all the thermic floors.

The main coastal features are the bays of Portete, Honda, Hondita and Cocineta, Cabo de la Vela and the Coco, Aguja, and Gallinas promontories. The last one is the far northern point of Colombia. The river network is simple. Its main hydric source is the Ranchería River. It begins at the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and continues northwest,

³ Venezuelatuya.com, "El fin de un sueño," accessed December 9, 2015, <http://www.venezuelatuya.com/historia/independencia2.htm>.

flowing into the Caribbean Sea to the west of the city of Riohacha.⁴ The weather on the Guajira Peninsula is dry and arid with average temperatures between 27 C and 30 C; its highest temperature is 45 C.⁵

Colombia's border with Venezuela is 2,219 kilometers long (figure 3). The border was established by different legal instruments like the Spaniard Laudo in 1891, a Swiss Federal Arbitration of 1922, and the López de Mesa-Gil Borges agreement in 1941, which ended the long territorial negotiations.⁶

Border tensions

Diplomatic relationships between Colombia and Venezuela have been unstable in the last 15 years. The Venezuelan Government has been trying to find excuses to begin a war⁷ with its border countries with the purpose of creating a smoke screen to mask the country's political, social and economic problems—problems that are a consequence of their version of “Bolívarian” socialism.⁸ These border tensions have been evident in

⁴ Gobernacion de la Guajira, “La Guajira,” accessed December 9, 2015, http://www.laguajira.gov.co/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1182&Itemid=78.

⁵ Cerrejon Responsible Mining, “About La Guajira,” accessed December 9, 2015, <http://www.cerrejon.com/site/english/our-company/la-guajira/about-la-guajira.aspx>.

⁶ Republic of Colombia Chancellery, “Colombia-Venezuela Land Border,” accessed November 11, 2015, <http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/content/frontera-terrestre-colombia-venezuela>.

⁷ Noticias UNO, *Chavez ordeno prepararse para la guerra*, accessed March 24, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zv-xRBG3cj4>.

⁸ Voice of America, “El Socialismo del Siglo XXI,” accessed March 24, 2016, http://www.voanoticias.com/content/venezuela_chavez_socialismo_xxi_alba/1614123.html.

various public pronouncements made by the presidents of both nations and are a feature of many television broadcasts.⁹




Figure 1. Colombia-Venezuela border at Guajira península

Source: Gobernacion de la Guajira, “Fisiografía,” accessed March 24, 2016, http://www.laguajira.gov.co/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1182&Itemid=78 2015.

⁹ Tony S., “Hugo Chavez vs Alvaro Uribe” (You Tube video), accessed March 24, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3mi2YuizDQ>.



Figure 2. General Captaincy of Venezuela 1777

Source: Historia diplomática de Venezuela, “Delimitación de la Capitanía General de Venezuela 1777-1810,” accessed November 11, 2015, <http://historiadiplomaticadevenezuela.wikispaces.com/Conocer+la+situaci%C3%B3n+administrativa,+pol%C3%ADtica+y+social+de+la+Capitan%C3%ADa+General+de+Venezuela>.

Regardless of the long-standing international recognition of the present border, the Venezuelan Government is intent on provoking a crisis by pressing its own claims.. Significantly, the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was modified in

1999 by then-president Hugo Chavez Frias. The new Bolivarian Venezuelan Constitution states in its Article No. 10 that: “The territory and other geographical spaces of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, are those that belonged to the General Captaincy of Venezuela (figure 2) before the politic transformation started on April 19, 1810.”¹⁰ The difference between The General Captaincy of Venezuela in 1777 and The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2015 territories is shown on figure 2 and figure 3.



Figure 3. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2015

Source: Mapas del mundo, “Mapa de Venezuela 2015,” accessed April 4, 2016, <http://espanol.mapsofworld.com/continentes/sur-america/venezuela>.

¹⁰ Comité Nacional Electoral de Venezuela, “Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela,” Artículo No. 10, accessed September 1, 2015, http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/normativa_electoral/constitucion/indice.php.

At the same time, Article 14 of the same constitution, states that “the law will establish a special judicial regimen for those territories for their own inhabitants’ determination, and with the National Assembly’s approval, join the republic.”¹¹ The information provided by Article No. 14 of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela National Constitution, follows the example of the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. The Russian president said that the invasion was to protect Russians in the Ukraine.¹²

The Venezuelan government’s approach was shaped by The National Defense High Studies Institute (IAEDEN in Spanish). One of the exercises that this school held in 2008 for its students was the War Game “Guaicaipuro.”¹³ This game consisted in a war between Blue and Red countries that have a common border and are located west and east of the actual Colombian-Venezuelan border respectively. The game’s mission was to conduct the invasion by Red of a northern peninsula in Blue. This attack would be supported by guerrilla forces in Blue. Coincidentally the peninsula name is Diomara, very close to the name Guajira. At the same time, the guerrilla group name was “FARA,” very close to FARC guerrilla group in Colombia.

Thus, the wargame clearly demonstrated that Venezuela is actively planning a possible military action against the Colombian territory—especially in the Guajira

¹¹ *Constitucion de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela*, Artículo No. 14.

¹² Kathy Lally and Will Englund, “Putin Says He Reserves Right to Protect Russians in Ukraine,” *The Washington Post*, March 4, 2014, accessed January 20, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-reserves-the-right-to-use-force-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/92d4ca70-a389-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html.

¹³ German Vargas Lleras, “Juego de Guerra Guaicaipuro” (You Tube video of lecture, Colombian Senate, March 5, 2008), accessed November 1, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELoildIfOfA>.

Peninsula. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the actions that the Colombian government should take to defend its territory. First, it is apparent that the Colombian government should deploy a combined arms unit in the Guajira Peninsula, with the combat power that would allow it to defend Colombian sovereignty in this part of the country. Despite the looming danger, however, nothing was done until January 2015.

On January 20, 2015, the Colombian Ministry of Defense deployed the newly-formed Medium Task Force into the Guajira Peninsula.¹⁴ This Task Force was the first step in organizing an armored force that could defend the Guajira Peninsula from foreign aggression. The unit has 32 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV III) which were procured and fielded after a long contracting process. The LAV III is an armored personnel carrier wheeled platform that provides mobility to infantry and cavalry troops and had had a very good performance record in various combat situations around the world.

Nonetheless, a wheeled vehicle has not the same performance capabilities of a tracked vehicle in this kind of rugged, sandy, and rocky terrain. Key factors such as route flexibility, cross-country mobility, maneuverability, transportability, weight, potential for modifications, and obstacle crossing among others, demonstrate the supremacy of tracked vehicles over wheeled vehicles.¹⁵ Thus, it would be appropriate to evaluate the performance of armored units in terrain similar to that of the Guajira Peninsula, and identify which is the kind of platform would be more appropriate.

¹⁴ Fuerza Aerea Colombiana, “Activacion Fuerza de Tarea,” accessed October 23, 2015, <https://www.fac.mil.co/activaci%C3%B3n-fuerza-de-tarea>.

¹⁵ Paul Hornback, “The Wheel Versus Track Dilemma,” *Armor Magazine* (March-April 1998): 33.

Military Capabilities

To understand the nature of the military problem, it is important to identify the military capabilities of both countries at the border. Colombia and Venezuela do not have the same level of equipment and training. On one hand, Colombia has been entangled in an internal conflict for over fifty years. As a result, the Colombian Army is a highly capable and experienced force. Thus, the Colombian Army is very experienced in counterinsurgency operations, logistics support, and close air support. Conversely, the Colombian Army is weak in cavalry and artillery assets and lacks practical experience in conducting combined arms operations.¹⁶ On the other hand, Venezuela has one of the better equipped conventional armies of South America although it lack key capabilities such as tactical airborne command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.¹⁷

The Colombian Army has assigned its First Division responsibility for the northeast area of the country. Table 1 shows the list of brigades that conform this division and their location.¹⁸ The Venezuelan Army has the First Infantry Division at the Guajira Peninsula. Table 2 shows the list of brigades that conform this Division and their

¹⁶ Jane's Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Center, "Colombia Army," accessed December 1, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/MilitarySecurityAssessments/Display/1304600>.

¹⁷ Jane's, Military and Security Assesments Intelligence Center, "Venezuela Army," accessed December 1, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/MilitarySecurityAssessments/Display/1304766>.

¹⁸ Jane's Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Center, "Colombia Army."

location.¹⁹ Figure 4 shows the location of the Colombian and Venezuelan Brigades in the vicinity of the Guajira Peninsula.

Table 1. Colombian Army 1st Division units	
UNIT	LOCATION
1 st Division HQ	Barranquilla
2 nd Infantry Brigade	Barranquilla
10 th Mechanized Brigade	Valledupar

Source: Jane's Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Center, "Colombia Army," accessed December 1, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/MilitarySecurityAssessments/Display/1304600>.

Table 2. Venezuelan Army 1st Infantry Division units	
UNIT	LOCATION
1 st Infantry Division HQ	Maracaibo
11 th Armoured Brigade	Maracaibo
12 th Caribes Brigade	Machiques
13 th Infantry Brigade	Paraguaioia
14 th Mechanized Infantry Brigade	Barquisimeto
19 th Western Air Defense Brigade	Maracaibo

Source: Jane's Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Center, "Venezuela Army," accessed December 1, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/MilitarySecurityAssessments/Display/1304766>.

¹⁹ Jane's, Military and Security Assesments Intelligence Center, "Venezuela Army."



Figure 4. Location of Colombian and Venezuelan Brigades in vicinity of the Guajira Peninsula

Source: Modified by the author from Instituto Geografico Agustin Codazzi, “Map of Northern Border between Colombia and Venezuela,” accessed April 1, 2016, <http://geoportal.igac.gov.co/ssigl2.0/visor/galeria.req?mapaId=22>.

Population of the Guajira Peninsula

As was explained before, the Guajira Peninsula is comprised of the Guajira Department in Colombia and the Zulia state in Venezuela. Each one of these regional political organizations manage different data about their population. The Guajira Department has 957,814 people. Among them, 38 percent are Indians, 58 percent are *criollos* (mix between white, Indian, and black), and 4 percent are afro descendants. Among the Indian population the biggest tribe are the Wayuu whose language is Wayuunaiki.²⁰ The Zulia State has 3,704,404 people, and following the information from

²⁰ Cámara de Comercio de la Guajira, “Informe Socioeconómico Departamento de la Guajira 201,” 2015, accessed March 24, 2016, <http://www.camaraguajira.org/publicaciones/informes/informe-socio-economico-la-guajira-2014.pdf>, 4.

the last census in 2011, this population was composed by 2.8 afro descendants, 46.9 whites, 37.6 *criollos*, and 12.7 percent of the population recognize themselves as an Indian tribe member.²¹

A special characteristic about the population at the Guajira Department and Zulia State, is that the Indian population in both regions belongs to the Wayuu tribe. This is important because the Wayuu tribe does not recognize itself as either Colombian or Venezuelan, but as a Great Wayuu Nation. This Wayuu territory comprises almost the entire Guajira Peninsula, with 15,300 square kilometers in Colombian territory and 12,000 square kilometers in Venezuelan territory. The Wayuu tribe claims the Great Nation as its ancestral territory. This area has the following limits: the Gulf of Coquivacoa at the east, Boca de Camarones on the Caribbean Sea at the west, and the rivers Rancheria and Limon at the south. More than 90 percent of the tribe periodically moves between Colombia and Venezuela. They decide when and where to move based on their needs and where conditions are most favorable at any given time. The tribe recently stated that conditions of life are better in Venezuelan territory. The Colombian constitution in its Article No. 96,²² and the Bolívarian Venezuelan constitution in its Article No. 34²³ recognize the double nationality of their indigenous nationals. For this

²¹ Instituto Nacional de Estadística, “XIV Censo nacional de población y vivienda. Resultados por entidad y municipio del Estado Zulia,” 2014, accessed March 24, 2016, <http://www.ine.gov.ve/documentos/Demografia/CensodePoblacionyVivienda/pdf/zulia.pdf>, 25.

²² Congreso de la República de Colombia, *Constitucion de la República de Colombia*, Artículo No. 96, accessed September 23, 2015, <http://www.senado.gov.co/el-senado/normatividad/constitucion-politica>.

²³ *Constitucion de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela*, Artículo No. 34.

reason, the Wayuu population have official personal certificates from both countries. This facilitates their mobility through the international border within their territory. The Wayuu territory is shown in figure 5.

The recognition of the Indian Ancestral territories by the Bolivarian Venezuelan Constitution, opens the possibility for the application of Article No. 14, which provides for the defense of the Venezuelan citizens that live in Colombian Territory.²⁴



Figure 5. The Great Wayuu Nation

Source: El Heraldo, “Las Fronteras no Existen para la Gran Nacion Wayuu,” accessed March 30, 2016, <http://www.elheraldo.co/nacional/las-fronteras-no-existen-para-la-gran-nacion-wayuu-215788>.

²⁴ *Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela*, Artículo No. 14.

Instruments of the National Power

United States (US) Government joint publication 1-0 (JP 1-0) Defines Instruments of the National Power as “All of the means available to the Government in its pursuit of national objectives.” These means are the diplomatic, informational, military and economic forms of exerting national power.²⁵ The diplomatic instrument is the primary means to dialog with other states and foreign agencies. The informational instrument refers to the use of the media, interconnected global networks, and evolving social media platforms to communicate official messages and shape the environment to accord with national strategic goals. The military instrument of power could be used at home and abroad in support of the National Security goal to resolve situations of conflict or aggression. Finally, economic power is applied by the governments to encourage economic growth, raise the standard of living, and preventing economic and financial crises.²⁶

The acronym DIME has been in place since 1960, in the middle of the Cold War, as an abbreviation for Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic instruments of the national power. In the United States, these instruments of national power are used and managed primarily by the State Department, U.S. Information Agency, the Defense Department, and U.S. Agency for international development respectively in support of

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 2013), I-11.

²⁶ Ibid., I-13.

the executive branch of government in order to achieve and support national strategic objectives.²⁷

Although this terminology just explained belongs to the United States Government exclusively, the intention of this thesis is to apply the same principles to the defense of the Colombian sovereignty at the Guajira Peninsula. The holistic application of DIME could improve the defense of Colombian sovereignty at the Guajira Peninsula. It is important to understand that DIME is not part of the doctrine of the Colombian Military Forces. However, this thesis argues that the concept of DIME could be an important framework which could help the Colombian government and military to coordinate and apply national power in the defense of Colombian territory.

Given the tense situation that exist as a result of Venezuelan pronouncements, constitutional changes, and actions in the border regions of the Guajira Peninsula, the primary question that this research seeks to answer is: How could the integration of the instruments of the national power allow the Colombian government to maintain and secure its sovereignty over Guajira Peninsula? In addition to the primary question, there are several secondary questions which seek to clarify the situation.

1. What are the diplomatic measures that would improve the defense of the Colombian sovereignty at Guajira Peninsula by disrupting hostile intentions?
2. What are the informational activities that will disable hostile intention over the Guajira Peninsula?

²⁷ Robert Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power* (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2015), 225.

3. What are the military capabilities necessary to deter or counterattack hostile intentions over the Guajira Peninsula?
4. What are the economic measures that could disrupt hostile intentions over the Guajira Peninsula?

To answer the primary and secondary questions, this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the problem focusing on the history of border tensions starting since the creation and dissolution of The Great Colombia, the Guajira Peninsula characteristics, historic tensions between Colombia and Venezuela at the peninsula and the concept of the instruments of the national power. Chapter 2 provides a summary and assessment of the sources employed throughout the study. These sources are organized following the instruments of national power structure. Chapter 3 explains the kind of methodology that was used in the research project. Chapter 4 analyzes the information provided by the different sources and interprets it, in order to help the reader understand the problem and identifies possible solutions to it. Finally, Chapter 5 presents conclusions based on the analysis, answering the primary and secondary questions that suggest a solution to the border crisis.

Limitations

This thesis is limited to the identification of the causes and realities of the border tension between Colombia and Venezuela. The information explained in this document was provided by historic sources and books and was obtained by means of open-source research. The study is intended to support the national Colombian goal of maintaining the integrity of the Colombian territory in the Guajira Peninsula and to demonstrate how the

Instruments of National Power, as defined and used by the U.S. government, can be applied by Colombia to support this strategic goal.

Delimitations

This thesis aims to integrate DIME, as defined in United States Department of Defense Joint doctrine, to the tense situation at the Guajira Peninsula which is not well-known outside South America. The historical, geographical and military aspects of the crisis at the peninsula will be analyzed based on DIME. In turn, this analysis will provide ideas that could improve the defense of Colombian sovereignty over the Guajira Peninsula. By no means has this thesis pretended to formulate a national strategy or influence government decisions over the Guajira Peninsula, because this is a faculty that belongs entirely to the authority of the Government of the Republic of Colombia.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The sources employed for this thesis consist of books, articles, newspapers, documental series, and electronic websites that give the necessary background information for the identification of the problem and its possible solution. In order to facilitate the understanding of the relationship between the sources and the thesis title, this literature will be organized according to the DIME construct.

Instruments of the National Power

The concept of the instruments of national power is explained in the Joint publication 1 *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. This manual is the cornerstone for joint operations. Its concepts are applied by all the United States Combatant Commands around the world. The instruments of national power concept provides the intellectual framework for the development of this thesis.²⁸

Diplomatic

Every country has their own constitution, which is the main document that sets the legal basis for its government. This is why the Constitutions of Venezuela and Colombia serve as the principal foundations for the diplomatic instrument of the national power. The Venezuelan constitution was modified in 1999 during Hugo Chavez's presidency. Among the many changes, article 10 states the Venezuelan lays a territorial

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 1-0.

claim over the Guajira Peninsula, based on the fact that this territory was part of the General Captaincy of Venezuela before 1810.²⁹ Obviously, such a claim is a very significant development, and is cause for great concern by the Colombian government.

The Constitution of the Republic of Colombia was also modified in 1991 by the National Constituent Assembly. The new changes include expanded freedom of religion, legal protections, the creation of the Office of National Prosecutor, a constitutional court, and a new health system, among others. The national territory and the composition of the Armed forces composition and their responsibilities remained as same as in the former Colombian constitution of 1886.³⁰

Other relevant diplomatic documents are the international treaties that define the international border between these two countries. This thesis refers to two of these international border treaties: the *Swiss Federal Council Referee Award*, and the *Land Borders Demarcation and Rivers Navigability Treaty between the Republics of Colombia and The United States of Venezuela*.

The *Swiss Federal Council Referee Award* is internationally recognized treaty that defines the borders between The United States of Colombia and The United States of Venezuela (Names given to Colombia and Venezuela in the nineteenth century respectively). It was signed on September 14th, 1881 and had as an objective to settle differences between Colombian and Venezuelan interpretations of their land borders. The

²⁹ *Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela.*

³⁰ *Constitución de la República de Colombia.*

document stated that the treaty would end fifty years of unstable diplomatic relationships between the two countries.³¹

The *Land Borders Demarcation and Rivers Navigability Treaty between the Republics of Colombia and The United States of Venezuela* is an internationally recognized treaty that ratifies the land borders between the two countries and confirms the information provided by the Swiss Federal Council in 1881. This ratification document was signed on April 5, 1941 and is composed of 5 articles that described the land borders between the two countries in detail.³²

Other sources related to the diplomatic instrument of national power are the official websites of the Venezuelan and Colombian chancelleries. These sources provide information about what is the official perspective on the international border from the point of view of the Venezuelan and Colombian government respectively. The official website of the Popular Power Ministry for Exterior Relationships (abbreviated MPPRE in Spanish) names of the countries that share land borders with Venezuela, the country's demographics, and the principal tourist attractions.³³

³¹ Sociedad Geografica de Colombia, "Tratado sobre Arbitramento "Juris" entre los Estados Unidos de Colombia y los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, de 14 de Septiembre de 1881," accessed September 15, 2015, http://sogeocol.edu.co/Ova/fronteras_colombia/documentos/tratados/arreglo_limites_colombia_venezuela1.pdf.

³² República of Colombia Chancellery, "Tratado sobre Demarcación de Fronteras y Navegación de los Ríos Comunes con Venezuela," accessed September 15, 2015, <http://apw.cancilleria.gov.co/Tratados/adjuntosTratados/VE-05-04-1941.PDF>.

³³ Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, "Venezuela," accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.mre.gov.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5736&Itemid=221.

This Colombian Chancellery website presents a summary of the different international treaties that define the land border between Colombia and Venezuela, specifying the dates and the governments' representatives that signed each one of them. In this official website, the Colombian Chancellery provides electronic versions of each of these internationally accepted documents.³⁴

Besides diplomatic sources from Venezuela and Colombia, the examined published materials, such as books and theses from institutes of higher education. The book *De Verde a Maduro* is an analysis of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and the way in which he got in touch with former president Hugo Chavez Frias. The author provides the context for the current crisis with a short history of Venezuela, the various economic crises that the country has endured due to its dependency on the oil industry, and the social and political consequences that had from these events. The author describes the coups that occurred on November 24, 1948, February 4, and November 27, 1992, and the strategies used by presidents Caldera, Perez and Chavez to manage the popular unrest. Nicolas Maduro does not have a long academic history. He graduated from High School, worked at the Caracas metro in the Capital of Venezuela, and became the president of the Metro Workers Union. Hugo Chavez organized the February 4 1992 coup against President Carlos Andres Perez but he was defeated due to divisions into the coup forces. Chavez was sent to Yare jail, where he received a visit from Nicolas Maduro on December 16, 1993, who was baptized by Chavez as "Verde." He gave tasks to Maduro as a messenger between Chavez and the military leaders in order to organize the

³⁴ Republic of Colombia Chancellery, "Colombia-Venezuela land border."

coup of November 1992. On March 26, 1994, Hugo Chavez was released from jail, and became a presidential candidate for the Fifth Republic Party winning the elections in 1998. Chavez was reelected on 2000 and 2006 with more than 60 percent of the vote. As a president, Chavez named Maduro Venezuelan Chancellor. Later he named him his vice-president. Before his death, Chavez anointed Maduro publicly as his successor; and after his death, Maduro was elected as the new Venezuelan President.³⁵

Other important published sources for the diplomatic instrument of the national power, include the thesis “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia.” This thesis relates the support that former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez was giving to FARC and how he used this support to expand his socialist movement through South America. The Venezuelan support for FARC went beyond sympathy and provided space for other international terrorist groups like ETA that are using Venezuelan territory as a safe haven. This thesis demonstrates the interventionism of the Venezuelan government into Colombian internal affairs.³⁶

Informational

The sources employed by the informational instrument of the national power were selected from open media websites. The objective of the research into this instrument,

³⁵ Roger Santodomingo. *De Verde a Maduro: El Sucesor de Hugo Chavez* (Bogota, Colombia: Random House Mondadori S.A, 2013).

³⁶ Carlos Padilla, *The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?* (Monterrey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 57. accessed January 20, 2016, [https://www.hsdl.org/?search&collection=nps&submitted=Search&creator=Padilla%2C+Carlos+A.&fct&page=1&advanced=advanced&tabsection=Theses+%26+Research+Reports&publisher=Naval+Postgraduate+School+\(U.S.\)&format=pdf](https://www.hsdl.org/?search&collection=nps&submitted=Search&creator=Padilla%2C+Carlos+A.&fct&page=1&advanced=advanced&tabsection=Theses+%26+Research+Reports&publisher=Naval+Postgraduate+School+(U.S.)&format=pdf).

was to find general information about Venezuela and Colombia, particularly on the Guajira Peninsula. The main source for this type of information about Venezuela and Colombia was Country Watch, a website that provides detailed information about all the aspects of each one of the countries in the world.

The Country Watch review of Colombia offers wide and complete information about the Republic of Colombia, analyzing the political, social, and economic aspects of the country and compares its situation with other countries around the world. The information extracted from this document provides a general picture of Colombia with updated 2015 data.³⁷ The Country Watch review of Venezuela also offers complete information on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It too provides an analysis of the political, social, and economic aspects of the country and is up to date.

On the other hand, the information about the terrain in the region was found in a variety of sources like “Colombia’s Guajira Peninsula, only in South America.” This website provide information about the Guajira Peninsula territory and its tourist attractions. The document highlights the arid desert geography and the location of the border between Colombia and Venezuela in the middle of the deserted peninsula.³⁸

³⁷ Denise Coleman. “Colombia,” Country Watch, accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.countrywatch.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/Intelligence/CountryReviews?CountryId=38>.

³⁸ Only in South America, Latam group, “Colombia’s Guajira Peninsula,” accessed September 15, 2015, <http://www.lan.com/onlyinsouthamerica/visit-colombias-guajira-peninsula/>.

Military

The purpose of researching the military instrument of the national power was to find the military capabilities of Venezuela and Colombia, identifying their strengths and weaknesses. This information was gathered from the Country Watch documents related to the informational instrument of the national power. At the same time, the research was focused on finding data about the two countries' efforts to improve their military capabilities in the region. The article "Colombian Army activates Medium Combined Arms Task Force," describes the activation on January 23, 2015 of the Medium Combined Arms Task Force at the Guajira Peninsula by the Colombian Government. This unit was equipped with 32 vehicles LAV III, recently purchased from Canadian Military Industries. Additional equipment includes EE9 and EE11 vehicles owned by the Colombian Army since 1982.³⁹

The next step was to find sources that could provide information about what kind of equipment could strengthen the weaknesses identified. Different books and articles furnished valuable information. The article "Wheels or tracks?" tries to find a middle ground between the relative merits of tracked and wheeled vehicles based on their advantages and disadvantages. Tracked vehicles provided greater mobility over difficult terrain proper and may be fitted with a heavy main gun and heavy armor. Wheeled vehicles provide passive protection due to greater speed and the ability to use a lower silhouette to take advantage of the terrain for protection. The author also stresses the low

³⁹ Defensa.com, "El Ejército Colombiano Activa la Fuerza de Tarea de Armas Combinadas Medianas," January 23, 2015, accessed September 15, 2015, <http://www.defensa.com/frontend/defensa/ejercito-colombiano-activa-fuerza-tarea-armas-combinadas-vn14481-vst334>.

cost of this kind of platform. In the end, the document insists that each kind of vehicle is appropriate for different kind of missions.⁴⁰

Another article, “The Wheel versus track dilemma,” which was published in *Armor Magazine* stresses the tactical advantages of tracked vehicles over wheeled vehicles. It exposes the adaptability of track to different types of terrain and the advantage represented by the vehicle cone index, which is a key first order discriminator of the platform’s mobility. In other words, but on tracked vehicles the points of contact include the whole track surface. At the wheeled vehicles the pressure is superior because the points of contact are few. At the tracked vehicles the pressure is inferior because the points of contact are both whole tracks. As ground pressure increases, so does the percentage of terrain over which a combat platform is immobile. At the same time the wheeled vehicle are more vulnerable to bullets and shrapnel.⁴¹

Armor Magazine once again contributed with outstanding information, this time in its edition July-September 2015. The article “Armored Forces: An indispensable component of Strategic Deterrence” demonstrates the clear utility of armored forces in deterrence operations. It gives historical examples such as Operation Iraq Freedom, and current examples such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014. One of its conclusions is

⁴⁰ Lutz Unterseher. “Wheels or tracks? On the lightness of military expeditions,” *Projects on Defense Alternatives Publications*, accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.comw.org/pda/0007wheels.html>.

⁴¹ Hornback, “The Wheel versus Track Dilemma.”

that an army should maintain a capable armored force to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.⁴²

Economic

The information on the economic instrument of the national power was obtained from a series of sources that described the economic situation at the national and regional level. The essay “Transmission from Exchange effect to Colombia-Venezuela border Economy,” presents a descriptive analysis and quantitative data on economic exchanges at the border. In the last year, Colombian cities located on the border with Venezuela, have experienced first-hand the effects of the Venezuelan currency devaluation. This situation have been reflected in a marked reduction in foreign trade, a weak productive sector, high unemployment, and the lowest consumer inflation into the country.⁴³ As could be expected, the economic downturn in Venezuela has had marked effects on the Colombian side of the border.

The article “Guajira Department socioeconomic report,” is a summary of the Guajira Department’s economic performance during 2014. The author compares the Guajira’s economic development with that of the other 31 departments that conform the

⁴² Nathan Jennings, “Armored forces: An indispensable component of Strategic Deterrence,” *Armor Magazine* (July-September 2015).

⁴³ Diego Hernan Rodriguez, “Transmisión del Efecto Cambiario a la Economía de la Frontera Colombo-Venezolana. Ensayo sobre Economía Regional Banco de la República,” Ensayo No. 59 (Banco de la República, 2014), accessed January 21, 2016, http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/publicaciones?keys=ensayos+sobre+economia+regional&title=&tid=All&field_editor_value=&tid_2=All&tid_1=All&keys_1=&field_year_value=&field_dia_value=All&field_month_value=All&language=All&field_publication_number_value.

Republic of Colombia. Also, the report shows the Guajira Department inputs to the national GDP.⁴⁴

The “Regional Economic Bulletin III Quarter 2015,” is, as its name indicates, a quarterly publication produced by the Colombian Republic Bank Economic Studies Regional Center. Its purpose is to provide to economic agencies and the general population with trustworthy, accurate, and periodic information about the main economic variables in a given geographical region of the country. In this publication, the Caribbean Region, includes the departments of Bolívar, Atlántico, Cordova, Cesar, Magdalena, Guajira, Sucre and San Andrés. The economic landscape in this region during 2015 saw increase in mine exploitation, farming, tourism, and trade, and a decrease in international business, due to the reductions in exports and imports. This document helps to understand the economic development of the Guajira Department during 2015.⁴⁵

Finally, it was important to collect information about recent events that could affect the economic relationship between Venezuela and Colombia. The article “Venezuela believes that Cerrejón belongs to it,” deals with a claim made by Venezuelan Borders Studies Institute ⁴⁶ that claims Cerrejón Coal mine as Venezuelan asset because

⁴⁴ Cámara de Comercio de la Guajira, “Informe Socioeconómico Departamento de la Guajira 2015.”

⁴⁵ O. Gallo, and J. Antonio, “Boletín Regional Económico III Trimestre 2015 Región Caribe” (Banco de la República. 2015), accessed January 3, 2016, <http://www.banrep.gov.co/ber>.

⁴⁶ Institución de Estudios Fronterizos de Venezuela, “El instituto de estudios fronterizos de Venezuela, comunicado,” July 13, 2014, accessed January 19, 2016, <http://institutodeestudiosfronterizos1.blogspot.com/>.

it is located in Venezuelan territory according to the demarcation established in the latest version of the Bolivarian Venezuelan Republic's constitution.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Null Value, "En Venezuela Creen que el Cerrejon es Suyo," *El Tiempo*, May 4, 2000, accessed October 1, 2015, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1234704>.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The research for this thesis was conducted using a mixed methodology comprised of two methods: expert's review, and portfolio review and log. These methods were selected with the goal of finding trustworthy, authentic, and credible evidence for analysis.

The sources include a selection of national documents, books, magazine articles, and open media that provide information about the instruments of national power. Particularly relevant to the study are the National documents of Colombia and Venezuela, works on armored tactics, history books, and theses written by students from different disciplines. At the same time, the author analyzed daily news from Colombian and Venezuelan sources at the national level, and at the Zulia State and Guajira Department regional level. These provided detailed information that will help the reader to understand the border tension at the Guajira Peninsula.

The information gathered was analyzed using the intellectual framework provided by the instruments of national power. The results of the analysis were then used to provide answers to the main and secondary research questions. The answers were organized depending on the advantage or disadvantage that they could provide to the maintenance of the national sovereignty of Colombia over the Guajira Peninsula.

In the context of this study an advantage means that a potential solution will diminish the border tension and help preserve the sovereignty of Colombia. Conversely, a disadvantage means that the event or action in question will worsen the situation at the peninsula and represents a threat to the sovereignty of Colombia over the region.

Throughout the thesis, each chapter is organized following the instruments of national power framework. This format helps the reader understand the relationship between the problem, the information provided by the sources, the analysis, and the proposed solution.

Table 3. Methodology

	EFFECTS ON COLOMBIAN SOVEREIGNTY AT GUAJIRA PENINSULA	
CONCLUSIONS	ADVANTAGE	DISADVANTAGE
DIPLOMATIC MEASURES		
INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES		
MILITARY CAPABILITIES		
NATIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES		
REGIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES		

Source: Created by the author.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In accordance with the thesis format, the analysis follows the instruments of national power construct and provides examples of the approach used by US military, followed by its application in Venezuela and Colombia respectively.⁴⁸

Diplomatic

Diplomacy is also called the political instrument and relies on the persuasion capabilities of governments. Negotiations between countries and through international and multinational institutions like the UN, NATO, or UNASUR are included under diplomacy also.⁴⁹ Diplomacy is defined as “The job or activity of managing the relationships between countries.”⁵⁰

Venezuela

The Venezuelan government manages its diplomatic relationships through the Ministry of Popular Power for International Relationships, which identifies itself as an instrument of constitutional principles, in accordance with an anti-hegemonic, anti-imperialist, and Bolívarian ideal.⁵¹ Thus, the ministry serves as an instrument for the

⁴⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 2013), I-11.

⁴⁹ Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power*, 238.

⁵⁰ Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, s.v. “diplomacy,” accessed January 12, 2015, <http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/diplomacy>.

⁵¹ Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, “Gobierno, Mision.”

propagation of Bolivarian Revolutionary doctrine. The Bolivarian revolution is defined as the promotion of ideological and social change based on four pillars: (1) anti-imperialism, (2) social democracy, (3) anti-neoliberalism, and (4) the transition towards twenty-first century socialism.⁵² Venezuelan international relationships have been described as very active with other Latin America and Arab countries. At the same time, Venezuela has kept its distance with former allies such as Colombia and the United States, and has moved much closer to Cuba.⁵³

Venezuela belongs to different multilateral organizations, among them the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN). However, the Venezuelan government has demonstrated increasingly aggressive intentions towards neighboring states, particularly against Colombia. This aggressive posture towards Colombia began under former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez Frias, and has continued under Nicolas Maduro, the current Venezuelan president, a passionate follower of Chavez.⁵⁴ Maduro's blind faith in Chavez was reflected in his decisions as Venezuelan Chancellor. In this position, Nicolas Maduro had to justify the unjustifiable and translate the president's impulsive decisions into diplomatic actions.⁵⁵ The extraordinary powers

⁵² "Revolución Bolivariana," Ecured, accessed april 24, 2016, http://www.ecured.cu/Revoluci%C3%B3n_Bolivariana

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ El Comercio, "PERFIL: Nicolás Maduro: De chofer de bus a Vicepresidente de Venezuela," October 11, 2012, accessed March 21, 2016, <http://elcomercio.pe/mundo/actualidad/perfil-nicolas-maduro-chofer-bus-vicepresidente-venezuela-noticia-1481280>.

⁵⁵ Santodomingo, *De Verde a Maduro: El Sucesor de Hugo Chavez*, Kindle 107 of 2647.

that the Venezuelan National Assembly conferred to the president has allowed⁵⁶ Nicolas Maduro to issue decrees that are supported by the Bolivarian Constitution. These decrees have created alarm in and Exxon Mobil found and exploited an oil reserve at the Esequibo region, an area disputed by the two countries, Venezuela claimed ownership over this reserve.⁵⁷

The changes made to the Venezuelan Constitution in 1999, especially articles ten and fourteen, can be interpreted as excuses to create a war at the eastern border with Guyana or the western border with Colombia. The possibility of unrest on the border with Colombia is most likely due to the internal conflict that Colombia has been facing since 1964. On different occasions, President Chavez demonstrated his support for illegal armed groups in Colombia (FARC and ELN)⁵⁸ and he served as a key mediator in the liberation of people kidnapped by this insurgency groups, thereby granting legitimacy to the insurgents.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ezequiel Minaya, "Maduro ahora puede gobernar por decreto," *Wall Street Journal*, November 20, 2013, accessed March 21, 2016, <http://lat.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303985504579208600421791672>.

⁵⁷ Daniel Pardo, "El Decreto de Maduro que alarma a Colombia," *BBC Mundo*, June 23, 2015, accessed March 1, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/06/150622_venezuela_colombia_protesta_territorio_dp.

⁵⁸ NTC Television, "Presidente Chavez ratifica estatus politico para las guerrillas Colombianas (video)," July 24, 2009, accessed December 15, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IeISFAI7-ZY>.

⁵⁹ Venezolana de Televisión, "Liberación de rehenes (video)," March 1, 2008, accessed December 15, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2bMPfINXKQ>.

Colombia

The Colombian government manages its international relationships through the Colombian Chancellery. The basis for Colombia's international relationships is Article No. 9 of the Colombian Constitution, which states that the international relationships of the state are based on national sovereignty, respect for the self-determination of the people, and the recognition of international principles accepted by Colombia.⁶⁰ Like Venezuela, Colombia belongs to different multilateral organizations, among them, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN).

On different occasions the Colombian Chancellery has issued press releases against the aggressive incidents perpetrated by Venezuelans against the Colombian population along the international border between the two countries. These press releases are available to the public at the Chancellery website. For example, on January 31, 2016, there was a skirmish between the Colombian National police and the Bolivarian Venezuelan armed force that was chasing Colombian fishermen. On March 27, 2015, the governor of the Venezuelan state of Tachira, Jose Gregorio Vielma Mora, accused the Colombian population that lives in that state of perpetrating terrorist acts on Venezuelan territory. As a result of this incident, the Venezuelan government closed the border on August 23, 2015.⁶¹

⁶⁰ *Constitución de la República de Colombia*, Artículo No. 9.

⁶¹ Republic of Colombia Chancellery, "Sala de prensa, comunicados oficiales."

This analysis of the diplomatic relationships between Colombia and Venezuela, at the Guajira Peninsula, demonstrate the difficult situation that the Colombian and Venezuelan citizens experience at the border. This is due to the lack of recognition of long-standing international agreements and inflammatory diplomatic actions by the Venezuelan government. Thus, the Colombian government has taken diplomatic measures to reinforce its position before the Venezuelan government's aggressive posture.

Informational

The informational instrument of policy disseminates and collects information to foreign and domestic recipients. Its central objective is to communicate the story of the government and spread its message to the world. An example of this is the way in which the United States government develops the informational instrument. Some of the better known programs executed by United States are Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, and the various cultural and educational exchange programs.⁶²

Venezuela

Unfortunately there is not much reliable information about the Venezuelan informational instrument of national power. One of the big challenges for the development of this thesis has been the lack of Venezuelan sources available in open media. At the same time, this could be interpreted as a reflection of the strong and effective government control that the Venezuelan government exerts over the

⁶² Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power*, 229.

informational instrument of national power. This is why international organizations have made statements about the lack of freedom of speech in Venezuela.

In its global report for 2015, Human Rights Watch explains concern over the current situation in Venezuela where the government has increased its control over public media. Although some newspapers and radio broadcasters express opposition to the actual government, others decide to censor themselves, fearing reprisals, or worse. For instance, in 2010, the Venezuelan National Assembly reformed the Organic Telecommunications Law, conceding new faculties to the government to suspend or revoke transmission rights to private media when the government considered it convenient to the national interests. At the same time, the National Assembly extended the coverage of this media law to the internet. This law contains many restrictions. For example, it restricts any case of “incitement” a very broad term that could be applied to many different activities.⁶³ Amnesty International in its 2015 report, informed that the Interamerican Court of Human Rights ordered to Venezuelan government to re-institute the broadcasting license of Radio Caracas Television, which was withheld in 2007, an order that has been ignored by Venezuela.⁶⁴

Besides the changes made to the Organic Telecommunications Law, the newspapers are facing an additional obstacle. On February 2016, eighty-six Venezuelan newspapers announced that they were out of paper reserves and were not able to keep

⁶³ Human Rights Watch, *2015 World Report: Venezuela*. “Libertad de Expresion,” accessed March 4, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/es/world-report/2015/country-chapters/268134>.

⁶⁴ Amnesty International, “Venezuela 2015/2016,” accessed March 5, 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/venezuela/report-venezuela/>.

printing the news. This is because most of the Venezuelan newspapers receive their paper supply from other countries, but the Venezuelan government has centralized all paper imports and also controls the distribution of printed news. The opposition calls this monopoly a new form of media censorship.⁶⁵

This media crisis is similar to the crisis of April 2014 when the Venezuelan press could not afford to import paper. On this occasion, The Colombian Association of Informative Media and Diaries Editors (ANDIARIOS by its abbreviation in Spanish) made a loan of fifty-two tons of paper to the Venezuelan Newspapers *El Nacional*, *El Impulso*, and *El Nuevo País*. This amount of paper arrived at Cartagena Colombia by sea and was sent to Venezuela by land.⁶⁶

Colombia

The Colombian government projects this instrument of national power through the Colombian National Army broadcasting stations that are located in fifteen key areas throughout the country. In the Guajira Peninsula, the broadcasting station is located in Maicao city, and its dial frequency is 103.7 FM.⁶⁷ This broadcasting radio station transmits twenty-four hours a day in Spanish, and covers the entire Guajira Peninsula.

⁶⁵ Al Jazeera, "Stop the press: Venezuela's media war," February 8, 2016, accessed March 1, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2016/02/stop-press-venezuela-media-war-160207072629613.html>.

⁶⁶ Semana, "Colombia exporta papel a diarios Venezolanos," April 1, 2014, accessed March 2, 2016, <http://www.semana.com/mundo/articulo/crisis-en-venezuela-diarios-colombianos-exportan-papel/382259-3>.

⁶⁷ Emisora del Ejercito Nacional, "Colombia Stereo," accessed March 1, 2016, <http://www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/content/quienes-somos>.

The difficulties experienced by open media in Venezuela illustrate the diplomatic struggles that the governments of Colombia and Venezuela have had for more than twenty years.⁶⁸ On the one hand, Colombia has been faithful to its democratic principles even in the midst of fighting a persistent insurgency, while Venezuela has become increasingly autocratic and has supported this very insurgency against a neighboring government. Beyond diplomatic differences, the Venezuelan government has taken offensive actions against the Colombian population, creating situations that have been reported in open media sources. For example, on August 2015, the Venezuelan president ordered the closing of all the border crossing points between Colombia and Venezuela when he announced an offensive operation to end the crime and smuggling at the border with Colombia. In his words, “the migration of Colombian paramilitaries to Venezuela is the cause of the economic crisis and the security problems that Venezuela was experiencing.”⁶⁹ Since August 21 until August 31, 2015, the Colombian Migration Office reported that 8,300 Colombians were expelled from Venezuela. This border crisis produced reactions from UN, the OAS, and non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, demanding guarantees for the rights of the displaced population.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Tony S., *Hugo Chavez vs Alvaro Uribe*.

⁶⁹ BBC Mundo, “Maduro ordena militarización de la frontera con Colombia para acabar con el crimen,” August 20, 2015, accessed March 3, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/08/150820_venezuela_colombia_maduro_frontera_dp.

⁷⁰ Natalio Cosoy, “Crisis fronteriza entre Colombia y Venezuela: Voy a denunciar a Maduro por crímenes de lesa humanidad,” *BBC Mundo*, August 31, 2015, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/08/150831_crisis_frontera_colombia_venezuela_alcalde_cucuta_donamaris_ramirez_nc.

From the informational point of view, the situation at the Guajira Peninsula could be managed by the Colombian government through a better management of information as an instrument of national power. The Colombian government could send clear messages of support to the Colombian citizens of the peninsula. This would help counterbalance the biased and disruptive propaganda that the inhabitants of the Guajira Peninsula receive from Venezuelan media sources.

Military

The military instrument consists of the Armed forces including the Coast Guard when it is configured for military purposes. This instrument is supported by law enforcement, public safety, and environmental protection governmental agencies.⁷¹

Venezuela

The Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, establish in Article No. 328 that the National Armed Force is integrated by Army, Navy, Aviation, and National Guard and that one of its main missions is to secure the integrity of the geographical space,⁷² which was identified as the General Captaincy of Venezuela.⁷³

The Venezuelan Military presence at the Guajira Peninsula is represented by the First infantry Division. This division is composed by the eleventh armored brigade in Maracaibo, the twelfth special forces brigade in Machiques, the thirteenth infantry

⁷¹ Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power*, 227.

⁷² *Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela*, Artículo No. 328.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Artículo No. 10.

brigade in Paraguaria, the fourteenth mechanized infantry brigade in Barquisimeto and nineteenth air defense brigade in Maracaibo (figure 4). All these units are located into Zulia state.

Colombia

Article No. 217 of the Colombian National Constitution establishes that the nation will have permanent Military Forces for its defense. These are constituted by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.⁷⁴ The Colombian army presence at the Guajira Peninsula is represented by the First Division. This division is composed of the Second Infantry Brigade in Barranquilla, Atlántico Department, and the Tenth Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Valledupar, Cesar Department (figure 4). These brigade headquarters are outside the Guajira Peninsula. However, the tenth brigade is currently deployed in dispersed locations throughout the Guajira Peninsula.

The Colombian Army does not have the same military presence at the international border⁷⁵ in the Guajira Peninsula, as the Venezuelan Army does, as was represented in tables 1 and 2. Although the Colombian Military forces are highly trained and experienced, as a result of the current internal conflict, they do not have the same amount of equipment that the Venezuelan Armed Forces have. At the same time, the Colombian government has not been strong enough in enforcing border control, especially at the Guajira Peninsula.

⁷⁴ *Constitución de la República de Colombia*, Artículo No. 217.

⁷⁵ Jane's Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Center, "Colombia Army."

Colombia has sustained an internal conflict for more than five decades. As a result, the Colombian Army is highly experienced and capable in conducting counterinsurgency operations. This experience has empowered the Colombian Army to create a credible counterinsurgency doctrine. In addition, other countries have learned from the Colombian counterinsurgency experience. For example, the United States Army is applying the Colombian counterinsurgency lessons to the war against terrorism in Afghanistan,⁷⁶ and the Nigerian Army wants to do the same in the conflict with the Boko Haram terrorist group in Africa.⁷⁷

The analysis of the role of the military as an instrument of the national power, identifies the necessity for the projection of adequate Colombian military power on the peninsula. The military units located on the peninsula are not reinforced enough to be capable of defending the international border from a foreign attack by Venezuela. Beyond the intangible capabilities developed by the Colombian military forces, it is necessary to update and acquire adequate military equipment for the defense of the national territory in the Guajira Peninsula.

⁷⁶ Michael O'Hanlon, "Colombia's lessons for counterinsurgency—and Afghanistan," *CNN*, March 10, 2012, accessed April 1, 2016, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/10/colombias-lessons-for-counterinsurgency-and-afghanistan/>.

⁷⁷ Afeikhena Jerome, "Lessons from Colombia for Curtailing the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria," *Prism* 5, no. 2 (2015), 95-105, accessed April 1, 2016, http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Lessons_From_Colombia_2015031902.pdf.

Economic

The economic instrument of national power leverages the nation's wealth to influence others. In some countries, this includes the use of sanctions and foreign aid in order to exert pressure and influence over the rest of the world.⁷⁸ In this context, it is important to identify the economic situation at the national level in Venezuela and Colombia, and at the regional level at Zulia state in Venezuela and Guajira Department in Colombia, because this comparison gives us an idea of the economic causes of the border problems and which country is in a better position to use its economic instrument of power to influence the situation.

National level

Venezuelan Economy

The Venezuelan Economy moved from an agricultural based economy to one based on oil production as a primary product after World War I.⁷⁹ The petroleum sector represents 30 percent of GDP yielding close to 90 percent of national exports revenue and more than 50 percent of government income. Due to oil dependence, the national economy has been hit abruptly by the decreased price of oil (figure 6). Besides, a radical increase in subsidies and government programs and reckless spending, tinkering with exchange rate controls, and the devaluation of the national currency, have accelerated and deepened the Venezuelan economic crisis.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power*, 232.

⁷⁹ Coleman. "Venezuela," 8.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 143.

The Bolívar, the Venezuelan currency, reflects the national economic crisis. The currency was officially devalued twice in February 2004, and March 2005. In 2008, the “Strong Bolívar” was created suppressing three zeros from the normal Bolívar (figure 8). In January 2010, another Bolívar devaluation occurred. In October of 2010, a new exchange rate known as SICAD (Money Exchange Complementary System in Spanish) was created. This is a parallel system that would be used for low priority imports and tourism activities. This SICAD is worth less than the official Bolívar. The Bolívar was devaluated again twice in February 2013, and April 2014, creating the SICAD II, a system with the purpose of allowing more dollar access to enterprises and individuals, increasing the Bolívar devaluation.⁸¹ Continuing with the information provided in figure 6, on January 2014, the exchange rate was \$450 Colombian pesos per Venezuelan strong Bolívar.

On February 26, 2016, the exchange rate was \$530.64 Colombian pesos per Venezuelan Bolívar.⁸² The Venezuelan currency had a slight recovery in the last eighteen months but not enough to recover the former exchange rate established in January 2001, \$3,250 Colombian pesos per Venezuelan Bolívar (figure 8). This constant change in the national currency value, could be interpreted as the government’s deliberate attempt to confuse the population by obscuring the economic downturn; but it has had other consequences, such as the lack of food items on the market. This is the disastrous

⁸¹ Rodriguez, “Transmisión del Efecto Cambiario a la Economía de la Frontera Colombo-Venezolana,” 8.

⁸² The Money Converter, “Exchange Rate Converting Venezuelan Bolívar to Colombian peso,” last update February 26, 2016, accessed February 26, 2016, <http://themoneyconverter.com/VEF/COP.aspx>.

economic reality that the Venezuelan population has been experiencing in the last two years.⁸³




Figure 6. Venezuelan Bolívar in Colombian pesos exchange rate

Source: Banco de la República, Ensayos sobre economía regional No. 59, Transmisión del Efecto cambiario a la Economía de la Frontera Colombo-Venezolana, “Venezuelan Bolívar in Colombian pesos exchange rate,” accessed November 1, 2014, http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/publicaciones?keys=ensayos+sobre+economia+regional&title=&tid=All&field_editor_value=&tid_2=All&tid_1=All&keys_1=&field_year_value=&field_dia_value=All&field_month_value=All&language=All&field_publication_number_value,7.

⁸³ John Otis, “Facing Severe Food Shortages, Venezuela Push Urban Gardens,” *NPR*, February 16, 2016, accessed April 24, 2016, <http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/02/16/466942128/facing-severe-food-shortages-venezuela-pushes-urban-gardens>.

The World Bank reports a Venezuelan GDP of \$ 381.3 billion dollars (data from 2012 as the most recent), a GDP annual growth of -4.0 percent, worse than its Latin American equivalent after June 2008 (figure 9), and an inflation of 62.2 percent.⁸⁴




Figure 7. Venezuelan GDP growth

Source: The World Bank, “Venezuelan GDP Growth,” accessed November 1, 2015, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/VE-xj?display=graph>.

Although the Venezuelan national economy is weaker than Colombia’s, due to its dependency on oil extraction and the downturn in oil prices, the Venezuelan government has threatened to freeze its trade relationships with Colombia. This threat was first made by former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez on July 2009, after both countries had diplomatic disagreements following a military operation against FARC in Colombian

⁸⁴ The World Bank, “Venezuela. Country at a Glance,” accessed February 20, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/venezuela>.

territory. As a result of this operation, the Colombian army found military weapons that had been sold by a Swedish enterprise to the Venezuelan government. This is important because when the Colombian government asked to the Swedish enterprise, about the distribution of its products to insurgency groups in Colombia, the Swedish enterprise answered that this weapons had been sold to the Venezuelan government.⁸⁵ Naturally, the question arose in Colombia as to how these weapons ended up in the hands of the FARC.

Colombian Economy

Colombia has a great amount of natural resources which contribute to its economic power. It has important oil reserves and is a strong producer of gold, silver, emeralds, platinum, and a dynamic and newly-privatized industry coal industry. In the last ten years, the country exhibited a strong macro-economic performance with a flexible exchange rate and prudent debt management. As in other countries, the global economic crisis⁸⁶ and the low oil prices (figure 6) greatly affected Colombia.

⁸⁵ Dinero, "Chavez congela relaciones comerciales con Colombia," July 28, 2009, accessed April 1, 2016, <http://www.dinero.com/internacional/articulo/chavez-congela-relaciones-comerciales-colombia/81094>.

⁸⁶ Coleman, "Colombia," 137.




Figure 8. OPEC Basket oil price update until February 24, 2016

Source: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “OPEC Basket price,” accessed February 24, 2016, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm.

The World Bank reports a GDP of \$ 377.7 billion dollars in 2014 for Colombia and a GDP growth of 4.6 percent, bigger than the overall Latin-American equivalent after June 2010 (figure 7), and an inflation of 2.9 percent. All this data from 2014 is the most recent data available.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ The World Bank. “Colombia. Country at a Glance,” accessed February 20, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/colombia>.




Figure 9. Colombian GDP growth

Source: The World Bank. “Colombian GDP Growth,” accessed February 24, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/co-XJ?display=graph>.

Regional Level

At the regional level, the Guajira Peninsula includes both Venezuelan and Colombian territory (figure 1). The Venezuelan territory at the Guajira Peninsula is a fraction of the Zulia state and the Colombian territory in the same area is the Guajira Department.

Zulia State Economy

Economic activity in Venezuela’s Zulia State is based on petroleum extraction. The exploitation of its petroleum reserves, close to Maracaibo Lake, represents 80 percent of the Venezuelan petroleum production from the Maracaibo Lake eastern area. The biggest fertile land of the area, located south of Maracaibo Lake allows for important agricultural and cattle ranching development. In this way, Zulia is the leading national

producer of agricultural and cattle products as palm oil, grapes, milk, cheese, beef, chicken, and others. Zulia State maritime resources production is second at the national level.⁸⁸

Guajira Department Economy

The Guajira Department economy is very weak and depends on regional trading, mine exploitation, tourism, and services. Crops and cattle that are essential for daily existence are less important in terms of GDP.⁸⁹ The most important economic assets on the peninsula are the salt extraction at Manaure Saltworks and the Cerrejón coal mine.⁹⁰ Manaure Saltworks is the biggest salt mine in Colombia and produces 1,000,000 tons of salt per year.⁹¹ Cerrejón is the biggest outdoor coal mine in the world, and produces 33,700,000 tons per year.⁹² Cerrejón was claimed by a civilian Venezuelan organization

⁸⁸ Venezuela Tuya, “Zulia, Economy,” accessed November 13, 2015, <http://www.venezuelatuya.com/estados/zulia.htm>.

⁸⁹ Una Guajira turística, “Actividad Económica de la Guajira,” accessed March 5, 2016, <https://unaguajiraturistica.wordpress.com/actividad-economica-de-la-guajira/>.

⁹⁰ Cerrejon Responsible Mining, “About La Guajira.”

⁹¹ Maria Modesta Aguilera Diaz, “Salinas de Manaure: Tradicion Wayuu y Modernizacion,” *Banco de la República*, May, 2003, accessed April 1, 2016, <http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/contenidos/publicacion/salinas-manaure-tradici-n-wayu-y-modernizaci-n>.

⁹² Portafolio, “Salinas de Manaure volveria al millón de toneladas en 2016,” January 23, 2015, accessed April 5, 2016, <http://www.portafolio.co/economia/finanzas/salinas-manaure-volveria-millon-toneladas-2016-26674>.

that describes the mine as located in Venezuelan territory.⁹³ The Venezuelan claim over the Guajira Peninsula is based on the Article No. 14 of the Venezuelan Constitution.⁹⁴

The population in the Guajira has limited essential services such as potable water and energy. Most of the inhabitants are Wayuu Indians, They have to walk daily between two and three hours looking for water wells located in the middle of the high Guajira desert. This water supply problem is worsened by the El Niño complex weather pattern.⁹⁵

Beyond problems obtaining essential services, Guajira Department inhabitants experience a low level quality of life due to the corruption that has been found in regional government investments. The Wayuu population stated that Guajira is suffering more from political corruption than for water scarcity.⁹⁶ On different occasion, the national and departmental governments have invested in water network programs, but the results of these investments have not been realized.⁹⁷

This analysis shows that, at the national level, the Venezuelan economic situation is worsening and does not seems to improve in the near future. However, if Colombia would depend economically from Venezuela, the Colombian economy would be hardly

⁹³ Value, “En Venezuela Creen que el Cerrejon es Suyo.”

⁹⁴ *Constitucion de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela*, Artículo No. 14.

⁹⁵ US National Ocean Service, “What are El Niño and La Niña?,” accessed March 21, 2016, <http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/ninonina.html>.

⁹⁶ Tadeo Martinez, “Politiqueria y Corrupcion,” *Semana*, February 27, 2016, accessed April 1, 2016, <http://www.semana.com/on-line/galeria/politiqueria-y-corrupcion-se-tragan-a-la-guajira/463074>.

⁹⁷ Noticias RCN, “200 Horas conviviendo la Sed Wayuu,” accessed March 21, 2016, <http://www.noticiasrcn.com/videos/200-horas-conviviendo-sed-wayuu>.

affected by decisions like the closing of the border by the Venezuelan government. At the regional level, the Guajira Department is experiencing a very difficult situation due to the geographical and climatological conditions. Venezuela's Zulia State is in a better position due to its agricultural productivity. For this reason, the Indian population prefers to remain in Venezuelan territory.

In summary, the present situation in the Guajira Peninsula situation, as seen through the instruments of national power, shows the following disadvantages for the maintenance and defense of Colombian sovereignty:

Table 4. Analysis of the Colombian sovereignty at Guajira Peninsula through DIME integration

	EFFECTS ON COLOMBIAN SOVEREIGNTY AT GUAJIRA PENINSULA	
FINDINGS	ADVANTAGE	DISADVANTAGE
DIPLOMATIC MEASURES		X
Aggressive Venezuelan government posture		X
Article No. 10 Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela		X
Article No. 14 Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela		X
INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES		X
Use of informational media at Guajira Peninsula		X
Misinformation at the Guajira Peninsula		X
MILITARY CAPABILITIES		X
Deterrence capabilities on the international border at Guajira Peninsula		X
Colombian Army centered in counterinsurgency doctrine		X
NATIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES		X
Strong trading relationship with Venezuela		X
REGIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES		X
Essential services supply		X
Investment of resources		X

Source: Created by the author.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 4 analyzed the information gathered during this study. This chapter will provide conclusions based on the author experience and his application of the instruments of the national power, to the problem at the border between Colombian and Venezuela at the Guajira Peninsula. Other individuals could reach different conclusions based on their own background, experience with the application of DIME, and personal bias about the subject. The evaluation criteria applied to the conclusions, followed the parameters established at chapter three of the present thesis. This chapter begins by answering the secondary research questions. These answers, in turn, provide the information needed to answer the primary research question.

Diplomatic measures

The first secondary question was: What are the diplomatic measures that would improve the defense of Colombian sovereignty at Guajira Peninsula disrupting hostile intentions?" To answer this question, let us first consider the use of the diplomatic instrument of national power.

Colombia should continue producing diplomatic reports to inform international organizations about border treaty violations by Venezuela and its aggressive posture at the border. The reports should describe the aggressive activities that Venezuelan authorities inflict on the Colombian population. This will keep the international community informed of the irregularities that are happening in the peninsula, which may

enable them to support the Colombian government in the event of a possible attack on the Guajira Department.

The Colombian government should request that the Venezuelan Bolivarian government must agree with the international treaties signed by both countries which describe the long-established border between Colombia and Venezuela and must respect the international treaties signed by both countries. Colombia must insist that Venezuela renounce the claims over Colombian territory described in Article 10 of the Venezuelan Constitution. This article not only affects the population in general, but more specifically it affects the native Wayuus. Thus, it could also set the condition for a Venezuelan reclamation over the Wayuu Great Nation,⁹⁸ including those living in Colombian territory. Unfortunately, a repeal could be interpreted in a negative light by the Wayuus because they could see their rights as dual Colombian-Venezuelan citizens affected. Nonetheless, Colombia and Venezuela should ratify the current border, accepting the bilateral agreements signed by former presidents of both countries. These measure would not allow governments, no matter what their political tendencies might be, to create new claims about the subject before international organizations. Repeal of Article 10 of the Venezuelan Constitution would be very beneficial to the maintenance of Colombian sovereignty because this article, as written, could be the main excuse for a conflict between the two countries.

⁹⁸ Sandra Guerrero, “Las Fronteras no Existen para la gran nación Wayuu,” *El Heraldo*, September 6, 2015, accessed March 25, 2016, <http://www.elheraldo.co/nacional/las-fronteras-no-existen-para-la-gran-nacion-wayuu-215788>.

Informational activities

The second secondary question is: “What are the informational activities that will disable hostile intentions over the Guajira Peninsula?” An analysis of the information situation suggests that Colombia should reinforce information activities to influence the population in the Guajira Peninsula. Colombia Stereo Broadcasting Station should have programs directed to the Wayuu population that lives in the Wayuu Great Nation, located in both Colombian and Venezuelan territory. With the purpose of reaching this population, the broadcast has to be in Wayuunaiki, the Wayuu language. The idea is that the Wayuu population will willingly identify with the Colombian government, thus helping the Colombian government maintain control of the Colombian areas in the Guajira Peninsula.

Colombian Military forces should help the government by reinforcing information operations emphasizing the theme that the Guajira Department is Colombian territory and that the Colombian government will solve the needs of the peninsula’s population. This will also increase the contact between population and Colombian government represented by the Colombian military forces. In this way, the Colombian military can use its vast experience in winning the good will of the population to secure the government’s hold over the Guajira Department.

Military capabilities

The third secondary question is: “What are the military capabilities necessary to deter or counterattack hostile actions against the Guajira Peninsula?” An analysis of the strategic situation indicates that the Colombian Army must be capable of deterring the hostile intentions of a well-equipped conventional army against the territory of the

Guajira Peninsula and defend Colombian sovereignty. It is clear that the Colombian government is experiencing budget constraints due to the challenges that the current peace process with the FARC demands from the country. But, at the same time, it is a national security priority to allocate sufficient units with the requisite equipment in order to defend the Guajira Peninsula against credible threats from the Bolivarian government of Venezuela. In order to provide credible deterrence, the Colombian Army should reinforce its presence at the international border and the units should deploy with armored equipment that would be able to defeat an invasion by a strong conventional force.⁹⁹ This equipment should have a platform that can effectively traverse the desert and scrub terrain of area of operations.¹⁰⁰ Fielding a capable force would be a powerful tool for maintaining national sovereignty because it would increase the government's presence at the border and would maintain a clear demarcation of the national territory.

The Colombian Military Forces have been involved in an internal conflict for more than five decades. This means that they have concentrated their military doctrine on counter insurgency operations. The doctrine should be modified to ensure it adequately meets a conventional threat such as that faced in the Guajira Peninsula. Training too, must be modified so that soldiers gain proficiency in conventional warfare. This expanded capability would be a powerful tool to secure Colombian sovereignty over the Guajira Peninsula.

⁹⁹ Jennings, "Armored Forces: An Indispensable Component of Strategic Deterrence."

¹⁰⁰ Unterseher. "Wheels or tracks?"

Economic measures

The last secondary question: What are the economic measures that could disrupt hostile intentions over the Guajira Peninsula?” is best answered as follows by examining the economies of both adversaries at the national and the regional level to determine their relative strengths and vulnerabilities and what measures may be taken by the Colombian government to strengthen its position.

National level

Colombia could exert pressure by Venezuelan government by diversifying its commercial partners, particularly its source of import commodities. This already happened between 2008 and 2009. During this period, Venezuela increased its commercial relationships with ALBA, China, Brazil and the United States. But, on the other hand, the Venezuelan exports to Colombia decreased from 1,014 million dollars to 605 million dollars, negatively affecting the Colombian economy. As a solution, Colombia replaced the Venezuelan trade with other partners such as Chile, China, Brazil, and Canada.¹⁰¹ This strengthened Colombian sovereignty because diversification of its commercial ties will reduce dependence on Venezuela.

Regional level

The Colombian government should improve essential services at the Guajira Peninsula. The water scarcity problem is affected by environmental conditions. The national government should treat this problem as a humanitarian crisis. Unfortunately,

¹⁰¹ Rodriguez, “Transmisión del Efecto Cambiario a la Economía de la Frontera Colombo-Venezolana,” 3.

there are no immediate solutions for this problem. Both national and regional governments should increase construction of water wells close to the communities with the greatest need. The water wells should follow the structure of the water well-constructed by the government in October 2015.¹⁰² There will continue to be a level of discontent among the affected population until the government solves the water crisis in the Guajira Department. In addition, the government needs to address the problem of lack of sufficient energy supply. In this realm alternative sources of renewable energy could provide viable answers. For example, the weather conditions of the Guajira Department could be used to generate energy. The government should develop projects like the Jepirachi windfarm between the towns of Cabo de la Vela and Puerto Bolívar in the Guajira Department.¹⁰³ This is a successful pilot project intended to produce energy with wind turbines. This project could be expanded throughout the region to take advantage of the strong winds present in the Guajira Peninsula. The energy produced would increase the living conditions of Guajira inhabitants. Once local energy necessities are satisfied, the surplus energy produced could be sent to other departments in Colombia or even sold to the state of Zulia in Venezuela.

The Colombian government should reinforce the work of the national fiscal accounting institutions such as the Comptroller office—Contraloría General de la

¹⁰² El Tiempo, “Santos inaugura pozo de agua potable en la Guajira,” October 23, 2015, accessed April 1, 2016, <http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/pozo-de-agua-potable-en-la-guajira/16411556>.

¹⁰³ EPM, “Jepirachi windfarm,” accessed March 25, 2016, <http://www.epm.com.co/site/Home/Institucional/Nuestrasplantas/Energ%C3%ADa/ParqueE%C3%B3lico.aspx>.

República—¹⁰⁴ with the purpose of verifying the proper investment of the resources given to the regional government. This measure would reduce corruption, which is one of the main causes of the poor economic situation at the Guajira Department. These actions would address the needs of the Colombian population such as the need for water and energy. Solving these problems would be extremely beneficial to secure Colombian sovereignty over the area because, when the government takes care of the needs of the population, the population tends to identify with the Government, thus voiding interference from others—such as the Venezuelan Bolivarian government.

Instruments of the Instruments of National Power

The goal of this study is to answer to the primary research question: How could the integration of the instruments of the national power allow the Colombian government to maintain and secure its sovereignty over Guajira Peninsula? Based on the analysis of the information gathered in the present study, the answer to the primary research question is that the integration of the instruments of national power, could provide appropriate information to help the Colombian government defend its sovereignty over the Guajira Peninsula by applying those diplomatic measures, informational activities, military capabilities, and economic measures proposed as a conclusion of this research. The instruments of national power concept is not part of Colombian doctrine. However, based on this study, its application could improve the defense of the National sovereignty at the

¹⁰⁴ Contraloría General de la República de Colombia, accessed March 25, 2016, <http://www.contraloriagen.gov.co/>.

Guajira Peninsula. The following case from the Guajira Peninsula demonstrate how the government manage its international border.

On June of 2015, the Colombian chancellor sent a protest note to the Venezuelan government in response to a decree that affected the maritime space of Colombia in the Gulf of Coquibacoa. The Colombian chancellor has insisted that the government is appealing this unilateral decree before the International Court of Justice. One of the key comments in the protest note reads as follows:

The Republic of Colombia calls on the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to avoid unilateral actions, asking for sanity to prevail, when delicate subjects such as sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction are discussed.¹⁰⁵

Based on the definition of sovereignty as “the power that an independent country has to govern itself,”¹⁰⁶ this protest note was clearly a defense of Colombian sovereignty. But it was limited to disputing Venezuelan claims on Colombian maritime space, nothing was said or done about the critical economic situation of Colombian population at the Guajira Peninsula.

The Colombian government should integrate its actions on the Guajira Peninsula. As we have seen, applying the elements of national power included in the DIME construct is a powerful tool for this purpose. The application and the integration of all the instruments of national power could help the Colombian government maintain and

¹⁰⁵ CNN Español, “Colombia emite nota de protesta a Venezuela y le pide sensatez en temas limítrofes,” June 22, 2015, accessed March 25, 2016, <http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2015/06/22/colombia-emite-nota-de-protesta-a-venezuela-y-le-pide-sensatez-en-temas-limitrofes/>.

¹⁰⁶ Longman Dictionary of contemporary English, s.v. “sovereignty,” accessed January 12, 2015, <http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/sovereignty>.

defend its sovereignty over the Guajira Peninsula. First Colombian sovereignty over land and sea areas would be asserted through diplomacy. Then, the military, in the form of properly trained and equipped military forces would protect Colombian territory and its population from foreign aggression. Simultaneously, the government could use economic means to meet the needs of the indigenous population, primarily access to clean water. These measures would encourage the inhabitants of the Guajira Peninsula to remain faithful to their Colombian citizenship and this, in turn would motivate them to defend Colombian sovereignty.

Regardless the differences that could exist along the border, both countries, Colombia and Venezuela, respect and support each other. This used to be the normal situation, but has been changed due to the policies of Venezuela's last two presidents, Chavez and Maduro. Despite the current tensions, the citizens of both countries should keep in mind that Colombia and Venezuela were, are and will hopefully again become, sister nations, and that the problems artificially produced by the failed policies of Venezuela should not divide them in the future.

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